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ESSENCE AND REALIZATION IN THE
ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
Timothy G. McCarthy

A persistent complaint about modal forms of the ontological argument is that
the characteristic modalized existence assumptions of these arguments are
simply too close to the conclusion to be of much probative value in establishing
it. I present an abstract form of the ontological argument in which the properties imputed to the divine nature by these assumptions are replaced by any
of a wide class of properties of a sort I call “actualizing.” These include basic
theistic attributes such as authorship, sovereignty and omniscience. The import
of these arguments is to show that the metaphysical coherence of some of the
most familiar conceptions of the divine nature ensures their actual realization.

I
I shall present a new form of the ontological argument or, perhaps better, a
new form for ontological arguments. The ontological argument has many
alternative expressions, and so it is well to begin by placing the present one
in context. As I am using the term here, an ontological argument delineates
a set of properties that are assumed to constitute a partial specification
of the nature of God. These are agreed by all parties to the dispute about
theism to be properties that would be necessarily exemplified by God if
there were such a person. Let us say that such a set is essentially consistent if
it is possible that there is an object necessarily exemplifying each property
in the set. The argument then shows, or purports to show, that if the set
is essentially consistent, then there actually is some object satisfying each
property in the set. If successful, the argument thus accomplishes the apparently remarkable feat of amplifying the grounds we have for supposing
the given partial description of the nature of God to be essentially consistent to grounds for believing in the actual existence of an item falling under
that description. Positive theological uses of such an argument assume that
we have good reasons to suppose that the given set of properties is in fact
essentially consistent, so that the actual existence of an item falling under
the conjunction of those properties may be soundly inferred.
A persistent difficulty with these arguments lies in an interaction between the essential consistency assumption and the content of the assumed
description of the divine nature. In particular, the property of existence,
characterized in the natural way in terms of quantification and identity, has
often been placed into the divine nature on the ground that it is a perfection,
pp. 5–24
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or on the ground that it is a positive property, or on some other ground.
Within a familiar modal-logical framework, the necessary existence of an
item falling under the relevant properties is then an immediate byproduct
of the inclusion of the existence property in the partial specification of the
divine nature and the essential consistency of that set of properties. As
Robert Adams has remarked with regard to Gödel’s ontological argument,
such a consistency assumption seems to be simply too close to the conclusion of the argument to be of much probative value in establishing it.1
In the present paper, existence and other ontically tendentious properties
figuring in ontological arguments are located within a wide class of properties I call “actualizing.” Within that same familiar modal-logical framework,
it will be shown that ascribing any actualizing property to the divine nature is sufficient to arm a form of the ontological argument; and some of
these properties flow from what would normally be regarded as standard,
ontically-untendentious conceptual commitments of theism. Within that
framework, then, the consistency of some of our most ordinary conceptions
of nature of God may be shown to imply the actual existence of a being realizing those conceptions. The effect of all of this will be to blur the distinction
between the conceptual and the ontological commitments of theism.
II
Let us begin by considering a bit more closely a traditional structure
for such an argument.2 The divine nature has often been conceived as
an interconnected set of perfective properties. A perfective property is
roughly an idealized or limiting case of a type of state, capacity, condition, or power; it is usually added that such properties are “positive” (in
some sense). Thus, for example, omnipotence is an idealized condition of
power and omniscience of knowledge. A familiar idea is that the divine
nature is a maximal ensemble of such perfective properties. One form of
the ontological argument proceeds from the thesis that existence is a positive characteristic of things. Idealization of the concept of existence leads
to various notions of ontic robustness, or stable existence. The limiting
case of ontic robustness is necessary existence, which is then the perfective
property corresponding to the existence property.
Suppose, then, that the totality of relevant perfectives is simply consistent,
so that there is a possible world in which these properties are jointly exemplified. If “w” denotes such a world, there is an inhabitant G of w that, in
addition to falling under all of the traditional perfective properties (omnipotence, omniscience and so on) in w, also exemplifies the property of necessary
existence in w. A widely held formal principle concerning the concept of the
broadly logical or metaphysical necessity in play here is the characteristic
axiom for the modal system S5, which states that if it is possible that an outR. M. Adams, Introductory note to “Ontological Proof.”
This is a version, more or less, of the argument given by Leibniz in the New Essay Concerning the Human Understanding.
1
2
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come is necessary, then that outcome is necessary tout court. If the relevant
modality respects S5, then, G necessarily, and thus actually, exists.
That is almost the conclusion of the ontological argument, but there is
still one difficulty. The argument seeks to establish the existence of a being
in the actual world that exemplifies each of the divine perfections. We
have shown only that there exists a being G in the actual world that falls
under the relevant properties in the world w: but we have no reason as yet
to suppose that the Godlike characteristics of G in w should apply to G
also in the actual world.
We can address this difficulty by means of a natural generalization of
the robustness idea. Let P be any perfective property. G falls under P at the
world w, but G, it seems, would be less than maximally perfect if G’s exemplification of P were accidental to G at w. G is more perfect, ceteris paribus,
the wider the class of possible worlds containing w wherein G exemplifies
P. In the best case, G should exemplify P at each world possible relative
to w, so that G’s exemplification of P is necessary to G at w. Again by the
characteristic axiom of S5, then, G’s exemplification of P is necessary and
thus actual. Thus G exists and exemplifies each of the relevant perfective
properties in the actual world. That is the conclusion we sought.
III
The above is a sketch, in terms of the possible worlds heuristic, of a
modal form of the ontological argument. It is inspired by and more or
less strongly resembles a number of modal ontological arguments familiar
from the literature. The first-order logical framework for such arguments
is supplied by the modal logic S5. Since these arguments talk not only of
objects but of properties of objects and sets of such properties, their proper
formalization in terms of modalities requires a third-order modal logic in
which the second-order variables range over properties of objects in the
first-order domain, and the third-order variables range over sets of such
properties. I will be concerned throughout with arguments of this sort.
The framework developed here accommodates the above argument
and its variants, as well as some versions of the ontological argument that,
as far as I know, are new. That framework is based on a general observation in pure third-order modal logic that is introduced in section VI below.
Given a set X0 of initial properties, we first show how to characterize a set
X of properties on the basis of X0 and certain closure conditions; X is the
smallest collection of properties containing the properties in X0 and satisfying the conditions of closure. The closure requirements provide roughly
that X is closed under a strong relation of entailment between properties,
and that the necessitation ϕ of a property ϕ belongs to X whenever ϕ
does. These closure conditions are satisfied by the collection of properties
necessary to any object in the de re sense, which we may call the nature of
that object. Thus if the initial properties are all essential to some possible
object, then the resulting total collection X is essentially consistent, and
comprises part of the nature of that object.
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Say that a set of properties is structurally consistent if it does not contain
any property along with its negation. The observation of section V says
that if at least one of the initial properties is of the special sort that I call
“actualizing,” then either the total set X of properties is actually instantiated in each possible world (i.e., each property of X is exemplified, at
every world w, by an object that exists or is actual in w), or the set X is
structurally inconsistent. It turns out that existence is trivially an actualizing property, and the version of the result obtained by placing existence
along with the standard perfections into the initial set X0 is a natural reformulation of the ontological argument sketched in section II above.
We can, however, consider alternative initial sets, which constitute
non-standard starting points. The trouble with the classical starting point,
using existence as an initial property, is that on weak modal assumptions
the structural consistency of the resulting total set is trivially equivalent
to the possible existence of a being that necessarily exemplifies each of the
initial properties, including existence; again, this assumption has seemed
to many philosophers to be simply too close to the conclusion of the ontological argument to be of much help in establishing it. It would mark an
advance over traditional forms of the argument if we could think of the
initial properties—the properties in the set X0—as being uncontroversial
constituents of a theistic conception of the nature of God, and by that I
mean properties that all parties of the dispute about theism would regard
as constitutive of the nature of God if there were such a being. To put
existence into X0 is not far from saying, from the outset, that any possible
being exemplifying the divine nature necessarily exists. This is a conclusion
that one might hope to derive from a basic characterization of the divine
nature; but it is tendentious to regard it as fundamental.
I shall argue in section VII that there are in fact very familiar components
of theistic conceptions of the nature of God that are actualizing properties
in the technical sense required by section VI, and which thus, if put into X0,
lead to a corresponding X satisfying its conclusion: either the properties in
X are simultaneously exemplified at each world, or X is structurally inconsistent. These include theologically central properties of God characterized
in terms of casual or epistemic verbs (i.e., in terms of his role): e.g., God
as pantokrator or all-creative/sustaining, as omniscient, as sovereign, etc.
Thus any story that construes these features as constituents of his nature or
essence will be necessarily realized if it is structurally consistent.
I shall offer no structural consistency proof for the particular choices
of X we shall consider. However, the suggested candidates for membership in the initial set X0 are core components of theistic conceptions of
the nature of God; and the relations which lead from X0 to X are closure
conditions which are satisfied by the nature of any object whatever. A bit
more precisely: no matter what properties you put into X0, if the properties
in X0 are essential to an object a in a possible world w, then all properties
in X are necessarily exemplified by a in w; and for the particular choices of
X0 we shall consider, theism is committed to the thesis that the properties
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in question follow from the very identity of God, and are thus essential to
him. The summary import of sections VI–IX below is that the metaphysical
possibility of an item with a nature realizing some of the most familiar and
basic theistic attributes requires the necessary and thus actual existence of
an item exemplifying those attributes.
IV
Unfortunately, seemingly minor variations in the semantic underpinnings
of modal ontological arguments can have major consequences for questions of possible existence and actuality of just the sort we are dealing
with, and so it is appropriate to pause to describe a bit more explicitly the
semantical framework that will be adopted here.
That framework is not at all unusual, and probably deserves to be called
standard. It is essentially the model theoretic semantics for quantified modal
logic introduced by Saul Kripke in 1963.3 On this view, an interpretation of
a elementary modal language L is given by data that may be packaged in a
5-tuple ℑ = (K, H, R, ψ, Φ). K, H, and R supply the modal background: K is a
collection of objects, in the intended application taken to represent possible
worlds; H is a member of K (the “actual world”); and R is a binary relation
of relative possibility on K. In the intended application, it is assumed that
K represents the set of all logically possible total situations, and that each
such situation is possible relative to any other, so that R is the universal
relation on K. ψ is a set-valued function on the domain K of possible worlds:
for any element w of K, ψ(w) is thought of as the collection of objects that
exist or are actual at w. The domain of ℑ is the set |ℑ| consisting of all of the
inhabitants of all of the worlds in K, that is |ℑ| comprises all and only the
members of some set ψ(w). Finally, Φ is a two-place function that associates
each world w of H and each n-place relation symbol P of L with an n-ary
relation on |ℑ|, the extension of P in ℑ at the world w.
For a fixed world w in K, the formula Px1 … xn is true on the interpretation ℑ at w for an assignment of values a1, … , an to x1, … , xn iff (a1, … , an)
∈ Φ(w,P); it is not required that the objects in question are members of the
set ψ(w) of objects that exist at w. However, in the given interpretation
first-order quantifiers are restricted at w to the set ψ(w) of objects existing
at w, with the welcome consequence that at a given world the sentence
(∃x)A(x) asserts the existence of an object at that world falling under A(x).
If ϕ is a formula and w a world of ℑ, then ϕ is true at w for an assignment
if ϕ is true for that assignment at every world w* such that w*Rw; if, as is
usually assumed here, R is universal, that simply means “at every world.”
The extension of the indicated semantics to the higher-order framework
mentioned above presents no difficulty. We extend the first-order modal
language L to a language L* by adding second- and third-order quantification, and we extend the first-order semantics for L to L* by construing
3
Kripke, “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic.” Acta Philosophical Fennica 16
(1963), 83–94.
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second-order variables to range over properties defined over the relevant
first-order domain and third-order variables to range over sets of such
properties. For this purpose, a property in the interpretation ℑ may be
identified with a function mapping each world in K to a subset of the domain of ℑ, whose members are the objects taken to fall under the property
at that world. The definition of truth in L on ℑ relative to a world and an
assignment of objects to first-order variables is extended to a definition of
truth in L*, additionally relative to an assignment of properties and sets of
properties to second- and third-order variables, in the natural way.
A salient feature of the Kripke semantics is that at a given world on a
given interpretation, predicates may be defined for, and variables may
take as values, objects that do not exist at that world. This aspect of the
semantics can seem curious but is crucial for various applications. For example, one can define an existence predicate ε(x) quite naturally in terms
of quantification and identity, via (∃y) y = x; at any world w, ε(x) is true
of exactly the items that exist or are actual at w. The existence predicate
will be defined but false at w for any object that does not exist at w. If the
interpretation is to reflect our actual modal opinions, we must be able to
say, correctly, that there are some things that might not have existed (or
which, equivalently, do not necessarily exist). We can easily express this
claim in terms of ε(x), by means of the formula (∃x) ¬ε(x). For the purpose of making this sentence true, the occurrence of ‘x’ within the “” is
construed as taking a value at a possible world that does not exist in that
world but does exist in the actual world. Another example arises from
affirming the necessity of identity in the form ∀x∀y (x = y → x = y), which
requires of each actual object a that the pair (a,a) fall into the extension of
the identity predicate at every world w, whether or not a exists at w.
The present framework, then, assumes a universal domain of possible
objects but supposes that quantifiers at a world range only over objects that
are actual at that world. Perhaps the biggest advantage of this arrangement
lies in its allowing the satisfaction clauses for “” and “∃” to be stated in
the most natural way: an object (or n-tuple) falls under the necessitation
of a predicate if and only if it falls under the predicate in each possible
world, and at any world “∃” expresses existence. On the alternative “actualist” construal of the domains of worlds, the domain of a possible world
is restricted to objects existing therein. This requires a reworking of the
interpretation of “” if there are to be any true ascriptions of de re necessity involving contingent objects, but the obvious ways of doing this lead
to trouble. Objects should be counted as necessarily self-identical whether
or not they necessarily exist (I shall take it as at least sufficient for an item
to fall under a property necessarily that it do so essentially, and I take selfidentity to be a paradigmatic essential property of any object). The most
natural suggestion for accommodating actualism is to provide, where “A”
represents a monadic predicate, that an object satisfies a sentence of the
form “A” if it falls under A at each world in which it exists. The difficulty
is that this gets another family of cases flatly wrong; the most typical of
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these involves the predicate “(x exists),” which is false of any contingently existing object, but trivially true of any such object on the actualist
reconstrual of “.”
In defending the thesis that the Kripke semantics with a universal domain is the proper semantic framework for representing modal ontological
arguments, I do not mean to commit myself to any particular metaphysical
interpretation of that framework. We require a system of models wherein
possibilia are in a suitable sense represented, but within the present enterprise it is left open whether the constituents of these models are nonactual
objects or actual ersatzes for them. What is important about such objects
for an account of semantic relations is their structural role and not their
particular identities.
V
In this section I will develop the metaphysical background of the form
of the modal ontological argument presented below. For this purpose,
we assume given a fixed model ℑ of the sort described above, extended
to third-order logic in the indicated way. We think of ℑ as providing a
description of the necessity concept (broadly logical, or metaphysical
necessity) relevant to modal ontological arguments. In particular, the accessibility relation of ℑ is assumed to be the universal relation between
the worlds of ℑ.
Some notation will be useful. First, if K is the set of worlds associated
with ℑ, for any property ϕ, ϕ is the property that maps any world w
onto the set of all objects in the domain falling under ϕ at each world in
K. Secondly, if S is a set of properties, ∧S is the property that is satisfied by
an object a at a possible world w iff a falls under each property in S at w.
S entails a property ϕ iff for any object a and world w ∈ K, if a falls under
∧S at w, then a also falls under ϕ at w. If A is a monadic predicate in the
free variable x, (λx)A is the property it expresses; officially, then, (λx)A is a
function defined on K that maps any world w in K onto the set of all objects
a satisfying A in ℑ at w. We define ε (existence) as the property (λx)(∃y)x = y.
I shall be concerned with a special sort of property that I call “actualizing.” As the terminology would suggest, an actualizing property is one
that is exemplified by an object at a world only if the item exists or is actual
at that world. Equivalently, a property is actualizing if it entails the existence
property ε, which of course is trivially an actualizing property. Essential
properties of contingently existing individuals are not actualizing, since
such an individual falls under its essential properties in each possible world
but does not exist in all of them.4 Thus, for example, any object is necessarily
4
The semantic framework of the foregoing section is designed to accommodate this observation, since the extension of a property at a world consists of the objects that fall under the
property at that world, whether or not they exist therein. The intuitive idea the reader should
bear in mind is that the essential properties of an object are those that follow from a complete
specification of its identity. This point of view about essential properties has been persuasively defended by Kit Fine in “Essence and Modality”; see also “The Logic of Essence.”
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self-identical, and so on the intended reading of de re necessity self-identical
in each possible world, whether or not it is actual at that world.
Actualizing properties are closely connected to a corresponding family
of relations that I shall also call “actualizing.” An actualizing relation
holds of a pair (a, b) at a world w only if both a and b exist at w. There are
weaker notions of left- and right-actualization: a relation R is left-actualizing iff, given that a pair (a, b) falls under R at w and b exists at w, then a
exists at w; similarly, mutatis mutandis, for “right-actualizing.” Obviously
any relation that is actualizing is both left- and right-actualizing. That the
left- and right-actualization properties are jointly weaker than the actualizing property may be seen by considering identity, which is both left- and
right-actualizing but not actualizing (again, an object is self-identical in
every world, whether or not it exists in that world).
A pertinent example, for the purposes of the present discussion, of a
relation that is left- but not right-actualizing is the father of. On the thesis
of the necessity of origin defended by Kripke, it is a necessary property of
any particular woman that she has the father that she actually does. If Karl
is Alma’s father, then, the pair (Karl, Alma) falls into the father of relation in
each possible world. This does not require either to exist at any particular
world; however, the (actual) father of Alma exists and begets her in any
world in which Alma exists. This shows the father of relation to be leftactualizing. Clearly, however, the father can exist without begetting that
particular child. Thus the father of is not right-actualizing. There is a mild
paradox here: for, it would appear that “x is the father of y” can be defined
by “x begat y & x is male.” The difficulty is that the relation expressed by “x
begat y” is actualizing. In fact, it is a paradigmatic example of an important
species of actualizing relations that we shall shortly consider. If that is the
case, however, the relation father of, thus defined in terms of “begat,” must
also be actualizing. But it is not. I will try to sort this out at the conclusion
of the present section.
In an important class of cases, an actualizing binary relation between
two objects involves the existence of a connection between them in space
and time; such a connection may, but need not be, causal. In such a case, I
shall call the relation “real.” I take the notion of “connection” as primitive
here, but a connection between two things is roughly a state of affairs that
involves the objects themselves as constituents, and so exists at a world
only if the constituent objects exist at that world. A real binary relation
R(a,b) is thus equivalent to a form ∃xR*(x,a,b), wherein “x” ranges over
connections of the relevant sort and R*(c, a, b) holds when c connects a
to b in the relevant way. The ontological commitment of such a form to
the existence of a and b is thus a product of three factors: the existential
quantifier over connections; the fact that a and b are constituents of any
connection between them; and the fact than a connection can exist at a
world only if its constituents exist at that world.
Relations introduced by causal verbs are real. If “V ” represents such
a verb, the form “a V-d b” holds at a world w iff there exists a connection
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between the subject a and the object b which consists in a causal link between certain basic actions performed by a and an end-state of b.5 The verb
“to beget” mentioned above is a typical example: “a begets b” holds at a
world w iff there is a begetting of b by a at w, which is a generative connection between a and b in w involving both a and b as constituents. Examples
of this sort are readily multiplied. However, not all predicates that introduce real relations involve causal verbs; there are non-causal connections.
Pure spatial relations between objects afford one example. The pair (a, b)
falls under the relation is 50 km due north of at a world w if and only if
there exists a longitudinal path p of length 50 km, oriented north to south,
joining a to b at w; the connection in this case is not the path p itself but
roughly the state of affairs consisting in p’s joining a to b.
Let’s now return briefly to the puzzle about fatherhood posed above.
There is indeed a relation between people exactly defined by the condition
“x begat y & x is male,” viz., x fathered y. This relation obtains between x
and y when x is male and there is an appropriate connection between x
and y, a state of affairs that consists in x’s begetting y; and this connection
can exist only if both x and y exist. This means that the fathering relation is
actualizing. On the other hand, if in fact y is the daughter of x, the property
being the daughter of x is a property that y has essentially, and thus exemplifies in all possible worlds.6 This means that the pair (x, y) falls under the
binary relation is the father of in each world whether the relata exist in that
world or not. Thus fathers and is the father of are not even extensionally
equivalent. What then is the relation between them? Here I shall simply
state what I take the correct answer to be: x is the father of y just in case
x fathers y in every world in which y exists, or, putting “F” for “fathers,”
just in case ∀z (y = z → xFz). The characteristic structural features of the
father of relation readily follow from this characterization: in particular, it
is immediate that the father of relation is left- but not right-actualizing, and
(via S4) that this relation obtains necessarily if it obtains at all. Similar considerations will apply to a variety of analogous pairs involving verbs of
creation or authorship, in particular the pair “creates” and “is the creator
of,” which play a crucial role below.

5
On an influential analysis of action sentences due to Donald Davidson, the sentence
‘Shem kicked Shaun’ is true if and only if there is an action, e, such that e is a kicking of
Shaun and e is performed by Shem. If e is taken to be a basic action (roughly, something that
Shem can do independently of the causal structure of his context), then the action itself is
not the required connection, since it can exist without its bringing about the relevant end
state (for example, Shem could have performed the same basic action while missing Shaun
entirely). The connection in this case is the second-order state of affairs which consists in e’s
bringing about the end state in the appropriate way. The connection thus seems closer to
what Davidson calls “an event [action] under a description.” See Davidson, “The Logical
Form of Action Sentences.”
6
This is obviously a substantive metaphysical assumption. The contemporary doctrine
of the necessity of origin derives from Kripke, Naming and Necessity, n56. It seems fair to say
that the doctrine has won wide though not universal acceptance.

Faith and Philosophy

14

VI
In this section, I present a logical observation that will serve as a template
for a class of modal ontological arguments. In what follows, ℑ is again
a fixed Kripke model taken to describe the relevant necessity concept:
various notions, e.g, “world,” “property,” “satisfies,” “actual,” “entails,”
etc. should be understood as relativized to ℑ. A set X of properties is said
to be realized by an object a at a world w iff a exists at w and satisfies each
property in X therein. Here then is the observation:
Realization Lemma. Let X be any collection of properties defined over ℑ
such that:
(i) if ϕ ∈ X, then (ϕ) ∈ X;
(ii) X is closed under entailment of properties;
(iii) if ¬ ϕ ∈ X, then ϕ ∉ X;
(iv) X contains at least one actualizing property.
Then X is realized at every world in ℑ.
The proof is straightforward. Suppose that X is a given set of properties
satisfying the conditions (i)–(iv). Consider the property Xc = ¬∧X. Then the
extension of ∧X is nonempty at some world. For suppose otherwise. Then
the extension of Xc is universal at each world, so that X entails Xc. Thus
Xc ∈ X by condition (ii). But since X entails ∧X, we have in the same way
that ∧X ∈ X, which is impossible by condition (iii). Thus suppose that w is
any world and α an object that falls under ∧X at w. Since, by condition (i),
(ϕ) ∈ X for each property ϕ ∈ X, α falls under ϕ at w for any ϕ ∈ X, and
thus satisfies each property in X at every possible world in ℑ. Now by (iv),
some actualizing property A belongs to X. It follows that α falls under A,
and thus exists, at each possible world in ℑ, so that α realizes X at every
world in ℑ. This completes the proof.
The Realization Lemma is a rather easy result in pure third-order modal
logic; it is readily formalized in an appropriate third-order extension of S5.
As such, it has no philosophical implications. It acquires such implications
only if an appropriate interpretation is supplied for the frame ℑ and the
class X of properties above. ℑ, we have supposed, constitutes a satisfactory basis for a model-theoretic account of our discourse about broadly
logical or metaphysical necessity. To connect the ontological argument to
the Realization Lemma, then, we have to construe X to be a theologically
interesting set of properties. I will initially consider the following two possibilities for such a construal:
(1) X is the closure of the collection of all perfective properties of God
under the entailment relation between properties.7
7
Perfective properties are here understood the sense of section II above, roughly as idealized or limiting cases of positive conditions, capacities, or powers.
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(2) X is the collection of all essential properties of God (or the closure of
that collection under the entailment relation between properties, if
on this construal X is not already deductively closed).8
Neither of these suggestions quite works; it turns out that these two construals of the set X present complementary obstructions to an attempt to
use the Realization Lemma as a template for an ontological argument.
But exploring them briefly will lead us to a more satisfactory proposal.
Consider first (1). Conditions (ii) and (iii) are fulfilled on this construal;
moreover, theists attribute various perfective properties to God that are
actualizing and that would thus underwrite condition (iv). Prominently, a
traditional form of the ontological argument regards necessary existence
itself as such a property. A less tendentious example would be God’s creative relationship to the actual world, or his perfect knowledge of existing
states of affairs. Both of these examples involve properties specified in
terms of an underlying actualizing relation (introduced by the verbs “to
create” and “to know,” the latter interpreted for the present purpose as
expressing a real relation between an agent and a state of affairs).
The difficulty is that these examples do not comport with the condition (i). For example, for traditional theism the property of having created
the actual world is a perfective property of God; but it is not one that he
necessarily exemplifies if the actual world is only one of a multiplicity of
worlds that he might have created.9 A similar problem arises for God’s
omniscience with respect to the class of all propositions that are true in the
actual world. Many perfective properties, in short, appear to be contingent
(i.e., contingently exemplified by any object that exemplifies them); and
thus the necessitation of such a property is not exemplifiable.
A parallel difficulty arises for interpretation (2), under which X is taken
to consist of the properties essential to God. On that construal, the conditions (i)–(iii) hold but condition (iv) becomes problematic. The basic
difficulty is that it is not clear that any actualizing property is essential to
God. There are various actualizing properties attributed to God by theists
and which constitute central themes of traditional theism. Any description that characterizes God’s activity in the world, on the analysis of causal
verbs adopted above, specifies an actualizing property, but not, in general,
one that God falls under essentially. Again, for traditional theism, the fact
that God created the world that happens to exist is an exceedingly important actualizing property that he exemplifies; but he might not have
8
This is roughly to say that X consists of all properties that are necessary to God in the
relational (de re) sense. The necessary properties of an object are not uncommonly identified
with its essential properties. On a more discriminating demarcation of essential properties,
suggested by Kit Fine, the essential properties of an object are those that can in a certain
sense be “read off” an appropriate specification of the object’s identity; see the papers cited
in n4 above. It is then natural to suggest that the properties necessary to an object in the de re
sense constitute the smallest collection containing its essential properties and closed under
the entailment relation between properties.
9
Such an assumption, of course, would be challenged by Leibniz; it would not hold, for
example, if the actual world were undefeated and untied in perfection.
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created the world that actually exists, and so he might not have exemplified that property.
VII
Part of the allure that perfectionist versions of the ontological argument
have enjoyed may perhaps stem from the idea that if God has a perfection,
then it cannot be accidental that he exemplifies that perfection. It is part
of the very core of familiar theistic conceptions of God that he is perfect in
virtue of his nature or identity, which is one way of saying he exemplifies
his perfections essentially. If that is so, the condition (i) in the Realization
Lemma should after all be ensured if we take the class X to consist of the
perfective properties of God, or the closure of that class under property
entailment.
That something has gone wrong with this line of argument is shown
by the sort of example introduced at the conclusion of the last section.
Theism is not committed to the claim that God necessarily created any
particular actual item (including the actual world itself); but it is committed to the view that God is the creative source of everything else that
does in fact exist. Moreover, theism seems committed to the further view
that this property, authorship, accrues to God in virtue of his nature, and is
thus a property that he exemplifies necessarily. The thesis, then, is not that
God necessarily created any particular actual item, but that necessarily he
is the creator all else that is.
There is a longstanding controversy, running from the medieval nominalists through St. Thomas Aquinas to Descartes, about whether God
may intelligibly be said to have created certain items that necessarily
exist, objects of the sort we now call “abstract.”10 In order not to enter
these troubled waters here, we may simply restrict our attention to a more
guarded version of the authorship thesis, one that holds God to be the
creative source of everything that contingently exists (or of everything else
that contingently exists, if, contrary to the ontological argument, God himself should exist contingently). The logical form of such a commitment is
(a) (∀x)C F(g, x),
where the subscript “C ” indicates a restriction of the quantifier (∀x) to
nondivine contingents; call the property ascribed to g by (a) restricted
authorship. The predicate F(y, x) is read “y is the creator of x,” and is understood in exact analogy to the predicate “y is father of x” considered above:
to say that y is the creator of x is to say that y creates x in each world in

10
A negative answer is sometimes held to impugn God’s sovereignty. Descartes, of course,
vigorously defended God’s creative power with respect to what he calls the “eternal truths,”
traditionally regarded as necessary. For a nice discussion of the whole issue, see Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature?. Plantinga says that he regards the difficulties in reconciling
divine sovereignty with the modal status of abstract objects as the best argument he knows
for nominalism.
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which x enjoys existence. Thus, writing F* for the verb “creates,” (a) may
be expressed
(b) (∀x)C (ε(x) → F*(g, x))
Observe that (b) entails
(c) (∀x)C F*(g, x)
which asserts that God creates each nondivine contingent.
I shall now argue that actualizing: i.e., if (a) holds at a possible world w,
then g exists at w. The argument is straightforward, but requires one additional assumption, viz.:
(NC)

∃xC(x) holds; i.e., for any world w, some nondivine contingent
exists at w.

The justifications for (NC) I am aware of all make use of the assumption
that there are fact- or event-like structures coordinated with at least some
contingent propositions whose existence conditions match the truth and
falsity conditions of the propositions. Thus, for example, for any contingently true proposition of the form (∃x)Px, necessarily either the fact
that Ps exist or the fact that Ps don’t exist contingently exists, and these
existence conditions are rigidly correlated with the truth and falsity conditions of that proposition. More generally, what is required is a contingent
proposition p and a pair of possible objects p+ and p– such that necessarily
p+ exists iff p is true and necessarily p– exists iff p is false. Thus p+ and p– are
contingents whose existence conditions exclude one another but which
are together modally exhaustive. As a first suggestion, we might take p+
to be p’s exemplification of truth and p– to be its exemplification of falsity.
Talk of “exemplifications” can be given a precise sense in terms of Kit
Fine’s notion of a qua-object, and qua-objects make possible a variety of
other routes to (NC). Qua-objects have the following existence and identity conditions:
(QE) For any object a and property P, the qua-object a qua P exists at a
possible world w iff a exists and falls under P at w;
(QI) a qua P = b qua Q iff a = b and P = Q.11
Here then is another argument for (NC): for any property P, let P* be the
property defined for cardinal numbers that applies to a cardinal number
κ at a world w iff exactly κ objects exist and fall under P at w. Let |P|w be
the cardinal number of the set of objects that exist and fall under P at w.
Suppose now that P is so chosen that the cardinal number of Ps varies
from world to world but P is satisfied at any world by a bounded number
of existing non-divine particulars. Then at any world w, |P|w qua P*, that
is, the particular number that is the cardinal number of Ps at w qua being
the cardinal number of Ps, exists at w, and is a non-divine contingent.
11

Fine, “Acts, Events, and Things.”
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The above goes some distance, I believe, toward motivating (NC),
but I cannot pretend to have offered anything like a complete defense.
Certainly, it is always open to the skeptic to question the ontological closure conditions invoked above that give rise to the necessary existence
of contingents. But particularly in the case of qua-objects, this line seems
implausible. The simplicity and determinacy of the existence and identity
conditions for qua-objects suggests that everything required for their recognition as entities is present, and the demand for some more absolute
verification of their existence seems senseless.12
Armed with this provisional justification of (NC), let us return to the argument that the authorship property is actualizing. The argument is very
simple. Suppose that g falls under the authorship property at a possible
world w. By (NC), there is a nondivine object o such that o contingently exists at w. Thus, since (a) entails (c) and (a) holds at w, (c) holds at w, whence
F*(g, a) holds at w. Since F* is a real relation, it is actualizing, so that g exists
at w. This is what was to be shown.
Let’s connect this observation to the Realization Lemma. We have just
seen that authorship, the property of being the creator of every nondivine
contingent, is an actualizing property. Moreover it is a property that is an
integral part of the conception of the nature of God associated with many
forms of theism. As such, it is a property that would be held within those
conceptions to be necessarily exemplified by God. Suppose that X0 is the
collection of properties explicitly ascribed to the divine nature by such a
conception. We can then consider, in the role of the class X in the Realization Lemma, the smallest collection of properties including X0 and closed
under property entailment and necessitation. Closure under property entailment is the condition (ii) in the lemma, and closure under necessitation
is the condition (i). Our assumption is that the initial set X0 contains the
authorship property which, as just shown, is actualizing. Thus the condition (iv) is met as well. The Realization Lemma then ensures that if the set
X is structurally consistent, then each property of X is satisfied by some actually
existing object. Such a being would be an item existing in the actual world
that falls under each of the initial properties in X0. It would therefore exemplify authorship: it would enjoy the property of being creator of each
nondivine contingent, and thus of having actually created each nondivine
contingently existing thing.
VIII
What has happened here? We began by imagining a theist who has undertaken to compile a partial characterization of the divine nature. He
begins his list with authorship, the property of being creator of each nondivine contingent. Let us call such a position authorship theism. Authorship
theism, then, is a limited thesis about the divine nature that is not, on
12
For a contrasting view, with an excellent summary of alleged mereological difficulties
surrounding facts and fact-like objects, see Ariana Betti, Against Facts.
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its face, committed to the actual existence of a being exemplifying that
nature. Now the collection of properties constituting the nature of any
object is closed under entailment between properties and under the necessitation rule. Accordingly, the structural consistency of the closure of the
authorship-theist’s description of the divine nature under necessitation
and entailment may be regarded as a necessary condition of the metaphysical consistency of that description; and in that case the conclusion,
via the Realization Lemma, that there necessarily exists a being exemplifying the authorship property, may be regarded as a byproduct of the
metaphysical consistency of authorship-theism.
The same template may be used for various other versions of the ontological argument, involving actualizing properties that the separate versions
will argue, in each case on rather different grounds, to be properties essential to God. In these arguments, the initial properties are not at all suspect
prima facie: they are theologically salient, indeed familiar, candidates for
membership in the divine nature. Here are a few additional examples, with
brief commentaries on their status as actualizing properties:
1. Sovereignty: Every nondivine contingent is dependent upon God.
Such a property has the form
(N1) λx (∀y)C D(y, x),
where D represents a dependence relation.
There are in turn at least two natural candidates for an analysis of dependence:
Strict dependence: y depends on x iff y could not exist without x; equivalently, necessarily y exists only if x does, or again equivalently, the
existence of y entails the existence of x.
Counterfactual dependence: y depends on x iff y would not exist if x did
not exist.
Both of these relations entail a weaker relation Dϯ of material dependence,
such that Dϯ(y, x) holds iff either x exists or y does not. This relation is
clearly right-actualizing, and thus the stronger dependence relations are
right-actualizing as well. Under either interpretation, then, it follows via
(NC) that the property characterized by (N1) is an actualizing property.13
2. Omniscience. God is directly cognizant of every matter of fact.
Let us cast this epistemic attribute simply and directly into the form
(N2) λx(∀α)K(α, x)

13
It is worth observing that the strict sovereignty property is entailed by the authorship
property; but there may be forms of dependence of the created realm on God other than that
arising from authorship as, for example, when we speak of God’s sustaining, rather than
simply creating, contingent things.
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where the variable “α” ranges over facts and K is an epistemic relation between God and states of affairs in the world whose behavior is analogous
that of the relations expressed by perceptual verbs.14 The relation involves
a real relation, we might call it direct cognitive contact, between the cognizer
that the fact cognized that can obtain in any possible situation only if both
relata exist therein. Since K is a real relation, it is actualizing, and so the
property characterized by (N2) is an actualizing property, assuming that
each possible world contains at least one fact.
3. Omnipresence. This is the property of being literally present at every
spatial location at every time (or at every spatiotemporal location).
This property is a somewhat more controversial candidate for membership in the divine nature than the properties mentioned previously; it is
sometimes mistakenly thought to be entailed by the omniscience property.
In any case, if we take literally the idea that God is present in each part of
space, we are ascribing to God the property
(N3) λx ∀p Loc(x, p)
where p ranges over locations and Loc is the relation holding between an
object and a place when the object is located at that place. That relation is
actualizing, since for any object a and particular location p, Loc(a, p) holds
at a world w only if a exists and occupies p at w. The property expressed
by (N3) is thus also actualizing.
IX
Authorship, sovereignty, omniscience and omnipresence are all properties that have been central to discussions of the nature of God in
philosophical theology. I have argued that each of these properties is
actualizing, which, in an equivalent formulation, says that each of these
properties stands in the property-entailment relation to the existence
property λxε(x). I have already commented on the propensity of some
philosophers to place the existence property itself into the divine nature.
Echoing a common sentiment, I suggested above that placing existence
into the nature of God at the outset of an ontological argument is ontically
tendentious, and tends to rob the argument of probative force. However,
this difficulty does not directly affect a form of the ontological argument
derived from the Realization Lemma that places any or all of the above
properties into the basis set X0. These properties represent fundamental
conceptual commitments of forms of theism which are not, at least at face
value, ontically tendentious.
Here, then, is a normal form for ontological arguments. Let us say that
a set A of properties is essentially admissible if the closure of A under the
14
I do not take this analogy to imply a perceptual model of divine knowledge; it suffices
to assume that whatever the mechanism of divine cognition, God has unmediated epistemic
access to existing states of affairs.
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entailment and necessitation rules is structurally consistent. We think of
the set A as a partial specification of the nature of some possible object;
the essential admissibility condition says roughly that one does not arrive
at formally contradictory properties when one considers the properties
which are necessarily exemplified by such an object relative to its necessary exemplification of the properties in A. On the schema I am suggesting,
an ontological argument will
1. Identify a set X0 = { ϕ1, ϕ2, … , ϕn } of properties that constitute a partial specification of the divine nature.
2. Show that at least one of the ϕs is an actualizing property.
3. Conclude, by the Realization Lemma, that if X0 is essentially admissible, then the properties in X0 are jointly exemplified by some actually existing object.
To obtain the conclusion that the properties in X0 are in fact instantiated,
we need to add the premise
4. X0 is essentially admissible,
which is equivalent to the assertion that if a property is entailed by the
properties ϕ such that ϕ ∈ X0, then the negation of that property is not.
The justification of this assumption is to be given in other terms.
Arguments of the present sort, then, explicate ontological commitments
of the metaphysical consistency of certain representations of the divine
nature that may have seemed, at least prior to the arguments, existentially
innocuous.
X
The present framework for ontological arguments is likely to prompt a familiar challenge, albeit in a somewhat unfamiliar form. Gaunilo famously
responded to St. Anselm’s perfectionist version of the ontological argument by arguing that if it works at all, then one could show, in the same
way and with equal plausibility, that there must exist a perfect island.15
Echoes and analogues of Gaunilo’s objection have affected subsequent
ontological arguments, and it is appropriate to ask if a version of the objection arises here as well.
A natural form of it is not far to seek. The mechanism that generates the
conclusion of the ontological argument via the Realization Lemma allows
any properties at all to figure in the initial set X0, as long as this set is essentially admissible and contains some actualizing property. Thus consider
an arbitrary property that is essential to any object that exemplifies it; for
example the property H of being a horse. I shall take it that H is essential
to any object that possesses it at all. Suppose now that we simply graft H

15

Gaunilo, “In Behalf of the Fool.”
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onto one of the partial characterizations of the divine nature above. Thus,
for example, consider the set
X0 = {H, sovereignty, omniscience}.
We have seen that both sovereignty and omniscience are actualizing
properties. Can one then argue via the Realization Lemma, with whatever
plausibility as may accrue to the argument that arises by omitting H from
X0, that there necessarily exists a sovereign and omniscient horse?
No. The difficulty concerns the essential admissibility condition for X0,
which must be met if we are to move from Step 3 in an argument of the
form described above to the conclusion that X0 is actually instantiated.
We have prior modal opinions, grounded independently of our present
context, which imply that sovereign horses are not possible. Consider, for
example, the interpretation of sovereignty in terms of rigid dependence,
according to which an item g is sovereign at a world w if it is true of any
object that contingently exists at w that it could not have existed unless g
had existed. This interpretation of the sovereignty condition is entailed by
the authorship condition.16 But we have a firm modal opinion that the parents of any horse could have existed without engendering that particular
horse. If so, in any possible world the parent horses of any horse constitute counterexamples to the thesis that every contingent particular in that
world is strictly dependent on the given horse. I leave it to the reader to
work out a similar modal justification of the impossibility of necessarily
omniscient horses.
Can essentially the same response be made when the initial set consists
of the canonical attributes of sovereignty and omniscience by themselves,
or considered together? The answer is again “No.” Theists characteristically hold that everything (of a suitable sort) is dependent on God, and
that this is a property that is implicated in the very identity of God. It
is thus, for these theisms, an essential property of God, and so constitutive of his nature. Someone who wishes to oppose this position cannot,
without begging the question at issue, simply state a modal opinion to the
effect that nothing could be essentially sovereign (in the relevant sense); a
similar caution should hold good for the varieties of theism based on any
combination of the canonical attributes. The claim that nothing could be essentially both omniscient and sovereign, for example, requires argument
in a way, or of a sort, that the claim that nothing could be essentially both
equine and sovereign does not.
XI
The engine that drives an ontological argument of the sort I have been
attempting to describe is quite clearly the assumption that an actualizing
property can be essential or necessary to a particular item that exemplifies it. In the cases I have highlighted, the assumption takes the form of
16

See n13.
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the claim that God stands in some real relation or other to the created
realm, not simply as a matter of fact but in virtue of his identity. And so
the obvious way to forestall the conclusion of such an argument would be
to withdraw this assumption. There are two ways of doing that. We can
reject the assumption that God exemplifies the relevant property at all; or
we may retain the assumption that he exemplifies the property but give
up the idea that he does so essentially.
In the instances that we have considered, neither of these options seems
compatible with conceptual commitments of normal forms of theism. The
actualizing properties we have considered are basic theistic attributes such
as authorship (God as universally creating/sustaining, the role of pantokrator
described by the Greek fathers); sovereignty (the universal dependence of
the contingent realm on God); omniscience; and omnipresence. These are
hardly peripheral themes for the forms of theism that embrace them. To
deny that God exemplifies any combination of at least the first three seems
tantamount to changing the subject. And so to retain a theistic conception
of God while avoiding the conclusion of the argument, one would have to
hold that God falls under these attributes but to deny that they are part of
his nature. But that is not much better. If they are extrinsic to his nature,
they are not implicated in the very identity of God as an individual. A
form of theism that held this would be in the very peculiar position of
asserting that these very basic properties are in the most metaphysically
fundamental sense accidental accretions to the divine nature.17
In any case it seems to me that within the Western theistic tradition
the tendency has been to combine the view that God exemplifies these
properties with an essentialist explanation of why he does. The doctrine
is that he exemplifies them in virtue of his nature or identity. For such
a theistic orientation, then, the thesis that God falls under these fundamental properties is not really detachable from the thesis that he does so
essentially or in virtue of his nature. Thus, if the properties in question
make up the set X0 in the schema described above, for these orientations,
the thesis that X0 is essentially admissible is clearly pertinent. Essential
admissibility seems a necessary condition of the metaphysical consistency
of a specification of the nature of any object: what the schema of section IX
shows, then, is roughly that the metaphysical consistency of a description
of the divine nature ensures its actual realization if that description incorporates at least one actualizing property. And we have seen that some of
the most theologically salient descriptions of the divine nature impute to
it properties of just this sort.
17
To put the point in somewhat different terms, the properties considered above are plausibly also basic perfections. I observed above that not all perfections of God are constituent
properties of the divine nature, since some are contingent. But the most basic ones do have
this status within the most familiar forms of theism. The contingent perfections are derived
from conjunctions of basic perfections and contingent facts. For example, having created the
actual world is a product of authorship (a basic perfection) and the fact that the particular
world we inhabit is the actual one (a contingent fact); or knowing that Alexander was a pupil
of Aristotle is a product of omniscience and the fact that Alexander was a pupil of Aristotle.
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We normally distinguish the conceptual commitments of a theistic position from its ontological commitments.18 The conceptual commitments of a
form of theism tell us about the nature of God as a person. It tells us a story
about what God would be essentially like if there were such a person. One
would have naively thought that such a story could be consistently told
without generating an ontological commitment to the person characterized in it. Familiar forms of the ontological argument blur this distinction
in a radical way by placing something like the existence property into the
divine nature at the outset. But the general form for the argument explored
here shows that any actualizing property will initiate a more subtle but
analogous construction, and any essential description of God in terms of
his real connections to the world will assign such properties to his nature.
If any of these are regarded as theologically basic, then, we shall have to
give up the attempt to provide a metaphysically consistent fundamental
characterization of the divine nature that does not commit us to the actual
existence of an item falling under the characterizing properties.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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